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I. INTRODUCTION

At the commencement of any high profile criminal case, a Florida
circuit court judge will commonly need to rule on two defense motions: a
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how the legal profession should always be. Special thanks also goes to Peg O'Connor.
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motion for change of venue' and a motion to conduct individual voir dire.2
If the motion for change of venue is denied, or ruling is withheld until after
the voir dire process,' the trial judge will inevitably be faced with a third
issue: whether prospective jurors exposed to pretrial publicity should be
excused for cause during jury selection.4 The three issues are clearly
distinct; however, the legal principles underlying this "impartial-jury
jurisprudence ' 5 do not just logically interrelate, but have been woven into
a tangled web. And now, not only are Florida lawyers and judges left to
untangle this web, but the Florida Supreme Court just changed the rules.
With the Bolin v. State6 and Kessler v. State7 decisions, the Florida
Supreme Court took discretion away from trial judges and dramatically
altered the process ofjury selection in high profile cases. Prior to these two
cases, a trial judge enjoyed great discretion in determining whether
individual voir dire would be necessary in light of potential juror exposure
to pretrial publicity. 8 However, in Bolin, the Florida Supreme Court
effectively mandated that individual voir dire be conducted in cases that
generate a level of pretrial publicity which "creates the probability that
prospective jurors have been exposed to prejudicial information that will
not be admissible at trial." 9 Now, each and every trial judge nearing the
start of a high profile trial must determine whether this level of pretrial
publicity has been attained. And if this level of publicity is reached, then
individual voir dire, with specific questioning regarding the juror's
knowledge about the case is required. The judge, in fact, has no discretion,
despite the court's remark that it continues to adhere to the rule that the

1. See FIA. R.CRIM.P. 3.240.
2. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.300(b) (providing that the trial court may examine the prospective
jurors either collectively or individually).
3. It is common practice for trial judges to postpone ruling on a change of venue motion
until after the court attempts to seat an impartial jury. See WAYNER. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIM]NALPROCEDURE 999 (2d ed. 1992). In fact, the Florida Supreme Court encourages trial courts
to attempt to impanel a jury before ruling on a change of venue. See, e.g., Fosterv. State, 25 Fla.
L. Weekly S667, S668 (Fla. 2000).
4. The defendant may challenge ajuror for cause on the ground that the juror has a state of
mind that will prevent the juror from acting with impartiality. See FLA. STAT. § 913.03(10) (1999).
dissenting).
5. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,440 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
6. 736 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1999).
7. 752 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1999).
8. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 427. Even in the highly publicized trial of Danny Rolling, who
murdered five college students at the University of Florida, individual voir dire was not conducted
for the purpose of discovering the specific content of the pretrial publicity to which the jurors had
been exposed. Personal Interview with Hon. Stan R. Morris, Eighth Judicial Circuit Court judge
who presided over the Rolling trial (Mar. 15, 2000). Yet, the Florida Supreme Court commended

the trial court "for employing ajury selection process with ample safeguards." Rolling v. State, 695
So. 2d 278,288 (Fla. 1997).
9. Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1165.
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trial judge enjoys discretion in deciding whether individual voir dire is
necessary.'0
The court's ruling in Bolin was reaffirmed in Kessler, and the court
further held that any principles applied within the context of a change of
venue issue are not to be applied when determining if a juror should be
excused for cause." Additionally, a trial court must gather sufficient
information which proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a seated juror
can render an impartial verdict." The Kessler decision makes it clear that
the Florida Supreme Court considers it impossible in a high profile case for
a trial court to find a juror impartial beyond a reasonable doubt without
conducting individual voir dire regarding the juror's exposure to pretrial
publicity.
This casenote sheds some light on the reasoning behind the Florida
Supreme Court's recent decisions. In so doing, Part II briefly summarizes
the rules which have been set forth by courts in each of the three previously
mentioned areas of law: change of venue, juror competency and individual
voir dire.' 3 This rather academic treatment of these issues is followed in
Parts III and IV by an analysis and critique of the factual and legal
reasoning upon which the Florida Supreme Court based the Bolin and
Kessler decisions. Part V addresses the effect these decisions will have on
Florida state trial courts through a realistic application of the principles
established by Bolin and Kessler.
II. "IMPARTIAL-JURY JURISPRUDENCE'

14

Due process' s demands that encompassed within the right to a trial by
jury 6 is a right for that jury to be impartial." Juror partiality due to pretrial

10. See id. at 1166.
11. See Kessler, 752 So. 2d 552.
12. Seeid.
13. See generally Gerald T. Wetherington et al., Preparingfor the High ProfileCase: An
Omnibus TreatmentforJudgesandLawyers, 51 FLA. L. REV. 425 (1999) (providing a concise, yet

extensive treatment of all the issues involved in a high profile trial). The Bolin and Kessler
decisions would likely change the authors' advice regarding a Florida trial court's decision as to
which method of voir dire should be utilized in determining a potential juror's ability to remain
impartial after exposure to pretrial publicity. See id. at 472-73.
14. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,440 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
15. The following discussion concentrates only on the standards and protections demanded

by the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process under the United States Constitution. Clearly, a state judiciary could impose a higher
standard of due process protection as a matter of state constitutional rights.
16. Federal due process does not require that all states grant defendants the right to a trial by
jury; however, every state has constitutionally granted a right to a trial by jury. See Irvin v. Dowd,
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publicity compromises the very foundation of the criminal justice

process."i But what legal standards and mechanisms are constitutionally
required for a trial court to uphold this due process right?' 9 An answer to
this question is facilitated by addressing three legal issues: (1) change of

venue; (2) the voir dire process; and (3) juror competency as they arise in
chronological progression through the pretrial and jury selection stages.20
A. Change of Venue-Presumed Prejudice"'

In extremely high profile cases, inherently prejudicial publicity may
saturate the community in which the trial is to be held before the jury

selection process even begins. 22 If sufficiently prejudicial and inflammatory
publicity does so saturate the community, then prejudice to the defendant
may be presumed and due process requires a change of venue.23 However,
courts rarely presume prejudice without proceeding further to evaluate the
jury selection process for evidence of actual prejudice 4 Thus, relief is
granted under this standard of presumed prejudice only in extreme
2 6 the United States Supreme Court.
situations.'5 In Murphy v. Florida,

specifically noted that those cases in which prejudice was presumed due
to the pervasive influence of the news media "cannot be made to stand for

366 U.S. 717,721-22 (1961).
17. See id. at 722 ("The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal
standards of due process. 'A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process"')
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) (citations omitted).
18. See Miller v. State, 750 So. 2d 137, 138 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
19. At this point, it can be simply noted that the burden of proving that a defendant's due
process rights have been violated in any way as a result of pretrial publicity lies solely on the
defendant. See, e.g., Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723.
20. Clearly, mechanisms other than change of venue, individual voir dire and cause
challenges are available to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. See generally Wetherington,
supra note 13 and accompanying text. However, as these three areas of the law are most relevant
to the discussion of the Bolin and Kesslerdecisions, this casenote will focus only on these issues.
21. Presumed prejudice and actual prejudice are two recognized standards for evaluating
change of venue requests. See Cummings v. Dugger, 862 F.2d 1504, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989)
(providing a useful analysis and demonstrative application of these two standards).
22. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
23. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723,726-27 (1963). Rideau; Sheppardv. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966); and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) are three cases frequently cited as
exemplifying extraordinary circumstances in which the influence of the news media pervaded the
proceedings and, therefore, prejudice was presumed.
24. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,798-99 (1975). It is preferable for a trial court to
reserve its ruling on a motion for change of venue and attempt to empanel an impartial jury. See
Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177, 1182-83 (Fla. 1986).
25. See Cummings, 862 F.2d at 1511. An extensive evidentiary showing is required in order
for a defendant to meet his burden to prove he is entitled to relief under the presumed prejudice
standard. See id. at 1512.
26. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
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the proposition that juror exposure to information about a state defendant's
prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he is
27
charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process."
Furthermore, if the prosecution can prove that the impaneled jury was, in
fact, impartial, then the rule of presumptive prejudice is not to be
invoked."
B. The Voir Dire Process
If the circumstances surrounding a high profile case are not so
egregious as to warrant an initial finding of presumed prejudice by the trial
court, then the jury selection process will begin.29 Each juror is presumed
impartial upon entering the courtroom, despite the fact that a juror may
have already formed an impression or opinion regarding the case.3 ° The
critical issue that must be determined by the trial judge 3 is the nature and
strength of that preconceived opinion, and whether that opinion is
sufficiently powerful to prevent the juror from being able to set aside that

27. Id. at 799. 'The mere existence of extensive pretrial publicity is not enough to raise the
presumption of unfairness of a constitutional magnitude." Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 19 (Fla.
1985).
28. See United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 252 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Jordan v.

Lippman, 763 F.2d 1265, 1276 n.11 (1 th Cir. 1985) (noting that rarely is a finding of presumed
prejudice made without an inquiry into whether the existence of actual juror prejudice is indicated
by the voir dire, thus implying that if there is no actual prejudice evidenced in the voir dire record,
a reviewing court will not apply a presumptive prejudice standard); 4 Bundy, 471 So. 2d at 19-20
(finding that the defendant failed to specifically identify portions of the record that would require
the court to find "constitutional unfairness as to the character of the jurors selected").
29. At this point, the principles applied in the three distinct areas of law begin to relate in
their application. First, the trial judge must utilize a jury selection process which is sufficient to
reveal juror bias. Second, the legal standards regarding juror competency must be applied to each
juror during this jury selection process. Third, if a number ofjurors must be excused for cause, then
the trial court must determine if the actual prejudice standard established by the Supreme Court in
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,723 (1961), applies and, if so, the trial judge must grant a change of
venue motion. As a result, although the issues are segregated herein, the overlap between the areas
of law will be discussed.
30. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723 (holding that jurors not be wholly ignorant of the facts and
issues involved in a case and even jurors best qualified to serve on the jury may have formed some
impression or opinion as to the merits of the case). However, note should be made at this point that
an issue regarding the strength of this presumption of juror impartiality, as recognized by the
Supreme Court in Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723, is raised in the text below. See infra text accompanying
notes 246-52.
31. The trial court should determine whether a juror who has been exposed to prejudicial
pretrial publicity can lay aside a preformed opinion as "[tihe juror is poorly placed to make a
determination as to his own impartiality." United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.
1978). A juror's assurance of his own impartiality will support the presumption of his impartiality;
however, that assurance is not dispositive. See Copeland v. State, 457 So. 2d 1012, 1017 (Fla.
1984).
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opinion
and render a verdict based solely upon the evidence presented at
32
trial.
1. Collective or Individual Voir Dire?
The fundamental purpose of conducting voir dire is to secure an
impartial jury.33 The decision of whether or not prospective jurors should
be questioned individually regarding pretrial publicity and other areas
likely to reveal juror bias has historically been left to the wide discretion
of the trial court. 34 However, a defendant's due process rights limit the trial

court's exercise of its discretion. 35 Therefore, a standard used to evaluate
the sufficiency of a trial court's jury selection process is whether the

process was capable of providing reasonable assurance thatjuror prejudice
would have been discovered, if present. 6

32.
To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or
innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of
a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It
is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a
verdict based on the evidence presented in court.
Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723.
33. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,431 (1991) ("Voir dire examination serves the
dual purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting counsel in exercising
peremptory challenges.").
34. See id. at 427; see also Boggs v. State, 667 So. 2d 765,767 (Fla. 1996) (the decision of
whether individual voir dire is necessary to ascertain potential juror bias resulting from exposure
to pretrial publicity has traditionally been in the discretion of the trial court). Texas and Kentucky
are the only states which guarantee criminal defendants individual, sequestered voir dire as a matter
of right in all capital cases. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 424.
36. See United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279,285 (5th Cir. 1981); Waldrop v. State, 462
So. 2d 1021, 1026 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (specifically approving the Fifth Circuit's standard of
review for the trial court's jury selection process); Cummings v. Dugger, 862 So. 2d 1504, 1507
(11 th Cir. 1989) (the standard for testing the sufficiency of the voir dire process was set forth as
"whether the procedure used for testing juror impartiality created a 'reasonable assurance that
prejudice of the jurors would be discovered if present'") (quoting United States v. Holman, 680
F.2d 1340, 1344 (1 th Cir. 1982)).
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a. Case Law Prior to Mu'Min v. Virginia37

Prior to 1991, no general consensus existed among federal circuit courts
on the issue of whether individual voir dire regarding jurors' exposure to
pretrial publicity could be mandated under certain circumstances.38 In
United States v. Davis,39 the Fifth Circuit faced the issue of whether a
federal district judge erred in denying the defendant's motion for
individual voir dire in light of the fact that every prospectivejuror had been
exposed to pretrial publicity.40 The trial judge refused to undertake a more
thorough examination of jurors41 beyond asking them if they could render
an impartial verdict,4 2 and the Fifth Circuit reversed.4 3

The court reasoned that because the nature of the publicity, taken in its
entirety, raised a significant possibility of prejudice, the trial court should

have individually questioned each potential juror as to the details of his
exposure and its impact on his attitude toward the trial.44 The Fifth Circuit
based its ruling on the ABA Standards Relating to FairTrial and Free
Press, which recommend that each potential juror be examined
individually, outside the presence of the other veniremen, to determine the
juror's exposure and the effect of that publicity on thejuror' s impartiality.'
37. 500 U.S. 415,426 (1991). The Mu'Min Court acknowledged two kinds of cases which
have dealt with the requirements of voir dire. See id. at 422. The cases tried in federal court are
subject to the Court's supervisory power and thus the Court enjoys more latitude in setting the
standards for voir dire. See id.
at 424. Whereas, the Court's review of cases tried in state court is
limited to enforcing the defendant's due process rights under the Constitution. See id. at 422. Both
types of cases are analyzed herein, as all courts dealing with this issue have looked to each other
for guidance in determining their own standards.
38. Supreme Court Justices Marshall and Brennan, dissenting in the denial of certiorari in
Davis v. Florida,473 U.S. 913 (1985), recognized the need for the Court to address the issue of
"whether, and upon what showing, the Constitution requires trial judges to grant individual voir
dire." Id. at 916.
39. 583 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1978).
40. See id. at 196. The pretrial publicity included inadmissible information regarding
defendants' prior convictions. See id.
41. See id. The defendant moved for individual voir dire of every potential juror who had
been exposed to publicity, claiming that the sensational nature of the media reports created the
potential for prejudice. See id.
42. See id. The trial court did instruct the jury panel that their determination as to the
defendant's guilt was to be made based solely on the evidence presented in court and subsequently
denied the defendant's motion for individual voir dire after no potential juror responded that he felt
the publicity impaired his ability to render an impartial verdict. See id.
43. See id. at 198.

44. See idat 196. The test in the Fifth Circuit which resulted from the Davis ruling for
determining whether individual voir dire is necessary to protect a defendant's due process rights

is if the nature of the pretrial publicity creates a "significant possibility of prejudice," then mere
cursory questioning of jurors without individual voir dire is reversible error. United States v.
Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291, 1297 (5th Cir. 1980).
45. See Davis, 583 F.2d at 196. The Fifth Circuit ruled further that "[t]he juror is poorly
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The Fifth Circuit clearly stated, however, that its decision did not establish

"an inflexible rule" regarding individual voir dire.46

In 1984, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Hurley47 recognized
that "individual questioning may be necessary in some circumstances to
gain assurance that all prejudice has been exposed."" Furthermore, the
circuit court acknowledged Davis as a case in which the nature of the
publicity was especially significant so that the failure to question jurors
individually was reversible error.49 Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit in
Jordanv. Lippman 0 granted a writ of habeas corpus from a Georgia state
conviction and ruled that, if there is a significant possibility of prejudice
due to pretrial publicity and inadequate voir dire to discover potential
prejudice, then the defendant is entitled to relief.5 The court also
affirmatively answered the issue of whether the principles established in
Davis regarding individual questioning were binding on the Eleventh
Circuit in ruling on writs of habeas corpus:
It is true that the binding cases cited in the text are direct
appeals of federal criminal convictions; however, as the
discussion in the text makes clear, Davis both relied upon and
is in accord with constitutional principles derived from
Supreme Court jurisprudence which was enunciated in cases
involving direct and habeas review of state court proceedings.
Such constitutional principles, of course, are fully applicable
in the habeas context.52

placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality. Instead, the trial court should make this
determination." Id. at 197.
46. Id. at 198. The Daviscourt went further to specifically recognize "the district court's need
for flexibility in interrogating jurors as to possible prejudice." Id. at 197.
47. 746 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1984).
48. Id. at 727.
49. See id. In 1981, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the case law of the Fifth Circuit unless and
until the Fifth Circuit decisions were overruled or modified by the new Eleventh Circuit. See
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981). Note that the Eleventh Circuit
in Hurley, 746 F.2d at 726, as the Fifth Circuit in Davis,583 F.2d at 191, was reviewing a case tried
in federal district court.
50. 763 F.2d 1265 (11 th Cir. 1985).
51. See id. at 1275.

52. Id. at 1279 n.15.
Davis merely established a procedure by which the constitutional standards laid
out in Irvin could be satisfied. Other circuit courts have recognized that the
standard enunciated in Davis-significant possibility of prejudice plus inadequate
voir dire-follows from the precepts of Irvin and, thus, can form the basis of a
constitutional argument of juror partiality under the Due Process Clause and the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
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In 1989, in Cummings v. Dugger,53 the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a case
tried in Florida state court in which the trial judge denied the defendant's
request for individual voir dire.54 The defendant alleged that her Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial and her Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process were denied as a result of the lack of individual voir dire. 5S An
initial individual screening of the jury panel had been conducted by the
trial judge which consisted of two questions: whether the jurors had read
any material concerning the case, and if so, whether they could render a
verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial.56 The judge
continually reminded the jurors of the importance of their impartiality and
opportunity to discuss any doubts as to their ability
gave the jurors ample
57
to remain impartial.
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that, although the preferred approach is to
conduct individual voir dire, as held in United States v. Davis,58 the
decision is entrusted to the broad discretion of the trial court.59 In so ruling,
the circuit court specifically noted that the Davis court "did not go so far
as to require individual voir dire in cases of pretrial publicity." 6 Although

Id. at 1278 (citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit did not go so far as to find that individual voir
dire was constitutionally mandated, only that the procedure set forth in Davis was one way in which

a defendant's federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury could be upheld. See id.
53. 862 F.2d 1504 (I1th Cir. 1989).
54. See id. at 1507-08.

at 1506. The defendant alleged that the voir dire was constitutionally inadequate
55. See id.
as the defendant was unable to discern the prejudicial effect of the pretrial publicity on the
individual jurors. See id. The pretrial publicity included details of the murder, alleged statements
made by the co-defendants, an alleged plot to kill a state witness, and confessions made by codefendants other than defendant Cummings. See id.
56. See id. at 1508. Defense counsel had requested these two questions. See id. at 1508 n.8.
57. See id. at 1509.
58. 583 F.2d 190, 198 (5th Cir. 1978).
59. See Cummings, 862 F.2d at 1509. The circuit court did recognize that although the trial
judge is to be afforded discretion in the conduct of voir dire, the defendant's constitutional rights
limit that discretion. See id.at 1507. Interestingly, the circuit court cited United States v. Davis, 583
F.2d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1978), as holding that the procedure followed by the trial judge did not
adequately protect the defendant's constitutional rights. See Cummings, 862 F.2d at 1507-08. The
circuit court, previously in Jordanv. Lippman, 763 F.2d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir. 1985), had also
reviewed the Davis decision similarly as being a decision based upon constitutional rights.
However, the Davis court never made an explicit finding that the defendant's constitutional rights
were violated by the lack of individual voir dire. Rather, the Davis court sought to conform with
ABA standards, not constitutional standards, which espoused that individual examination is the
preferred approach. See Davis,583 F.2d at 196-97. This non-constitutional motivation for the Fifth
Circuit's holding was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Mu'Min, "Even those Federal Courts
of Appeals [including the Fifth Circuit] that have required such an inquiry to be made have not
expressly placed their decision on constitutional grounds." Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 427.
60. Cummings, 862 F.2d at 1508.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 5 [2000], Art. 6
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

Jordan ruled that in situations of potential prejudice, jurors must be
questioned individually about their exposure to pretrial publicity,6 the
Cummings court held that the trial judge's decision to limit the voir dire
process did not render the jury selection process constitutionally
deficient.62
b. Mu'Mn v. Virginia63
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether individual voir dire with specific content questioning regarding
pretrial publicity is constitutionally required. 64 Mu'Min had been convicted
and sentenced to death in a Virginia state court after the trial judge refused
to question the jurors individually regarding the specific content of the
pretrial publicity' 5 to which they had been exposed. 66 On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the defendant alleged his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process were violated due to the
lack of specific questioning of the jurors regarding the pretrial publicity to
which they had been exposed.67
The defendant claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment required the
trial court to go beyond merely addressing the issue of the pretrial
publicity, and make precise inquiries about the content of the exposure.
The Supreme Court disagreed. 69 The Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not reach so far as to require
individual voir dire regarding each potential juror's exposure to pretrial
61. See Jordan,763 F.2d at 1274-75.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See Cummings, 862 F.2d at 1508-09.
500 U.S. 415 (1991).
See id. at 417.
The pretrial publicity included the following information: the defendant's prior criminal

record, details regarding the murder and investigation, indications that the defendant had confessed
to killing the victim, and accounts of alleged prison infractions. See id. at 418.

66. See id at 417. The judge did, however, break the venire down into panels of four for
questions regarding publicity. See id. at 419. Whenever apotential juror indicated that he had been

exposed to publicity, he was asked whether he had already formed an opinion as to the defendant's
guilt and if so, whether the juror could remain impartial. See id. at 420. One juror who was
equivocal as to whether she could set aside her preformed opinion was removed sua sponte by the
trial judge. See id. at 421. Of the twelvejurors who decided the defendant's case, eight had read or
heard something about the case. See id. The Court specifically noted, however, that every seated
juror swore that he was not biased and could wait until all the evidence was presented before

reaching a conclusion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. See id
67. Seeid. at417.
68. See id. at 424.

69. See id. at 425. The Court recognized that no consensus of case law supported Mu'Min's
claim that precise inquiries into the content of pretrial publicity exposure was constitutionally

mandated. See id. at 425-26.
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publicity;7" thus, trial courts were to retain
great latitude in deciding the
71
questions to be asked during voir dire.
The Court specifically rejected mandating the questioning suggested by

the ABA in the ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice,7 2 and instead held that

in order for questions regarding the content of publicity to be
constitutionally compelled, the failure to ask these questions must render
the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair.7 3
c. Florida Case Law after Mu'Mn v. Virginia7 4

In 1994, the Florida Supreme Court, in Pietri v. State,75 addressed the
issue of whether the trial court denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment

70. See id. at 431. The Court discussed the distinction between the two issues of racial bias
and pretrial publicity as they each relate to individual voir dire. See id. at 426. Case law is clear that
the Fourteenth Amendment demands inquiry into possible racial bias. See id. at 424; see also
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 311 (1931) (finding reversible error when the trial court
failed to ask the jurors whether any of them might be prejudiced against the defendant because of
his race). Yet even in regards to this constitutionally mandated inquiry into racial bias, the Supreme
Court has been "careful not to specify the particulars by which this [inquiry] could be done. We did
not, for instance, require questioning of individualjurors about facts or experiences that might have
led to racial bias." Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 431.
71. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 424. "Mhis primary reliance on thejudgment of the trial court
makes good sense. Thejudge of that court sits in the locale where the publicity is said to have had
its effect .... "Id. at 427.
72. Regarding the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE 8-3.5 (2d ed. 1980), the Court
noted,
That is a stricter standard of juror eligibility than that which we have held the
Constitution to require .... Under the constitutional standard, ... '[t]he relevant
question is not whether the community remembered the case, but whether the
jurors.., had such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt
of the defendant.'
Id. at 430 (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984)). Furthermore, "[the fact that a
particular rule may be thought to be the 'better' view does not mean that it is incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 430-31.
73. See id. at 425-26. The Court did state, in dicta, that had the trial court been confronted
with publicity amounting to a "wave of public passion," then the Due Process Clause may have
demanded more extensive voir dire. Id. at 429 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961)).
74. Prior to Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 415, the general rule in Florida was simply that the decision
to conduct individual and sequestered voir dire was in the sound discretion of the trial court. See
Randolph v. State, 562 So. 2d 331,337 (Fla. 1990) (citing Davis v. State, 461 So. 2d 67, 69 (Fla.
1984)). Interestingly, the issue of whether the refusal by a Florida trial court to conduct individual
voir dire violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury had been
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but was denied certiorari. See Davis v. Florida, 473
U.S. 913, 913 (1985).
75. 644 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1994).
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right to a fair trial by refusing to grant his motion for individual voir dire.76
The publicity had been extensive at the time of the victim's death77 and one
week prior to the defendant's trial.7 However, the trial judge refused to
conduct individual voir dire regarding what specific information potential
jurors knew about the case.79 The court noted that the trial judge readily
excused prospectivejurors who had been exposed to pretrial publicity and,
as a result, had already formed opinions as to the defendant's guilt.80
Furthermore, although several seated jurors had been exposed to pretrial
publicity, each stated that they had formed no opinion and would consider
only the evidence presented at trial. 8'
The court held that there was no abuse of discretion committed by the
trial judge for not ordering individual voir dire, and adhered to the rule that
trial courts have discretion in ordering individual voir dire. 2 The court
citedMu'Min 3 for its ruling that a defendant does not have a constitutional
right to conduct individual voir dire, even in light of extensive publicity,
unless the failure to ask the questions would render the trial fundamentally
unfair. 84 The court also noted the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Cummings, 5
that while individual voir dire is preferred, it is not required.86
In a later Florida case, Boggs v. State,87 the defendant was denied a
motion for individual voir dire, and thus argued on appeal that he was
improperly forced to exercise peremptory challenges on three jurors who
had read about the case.88 The Florida Supreme Court held that the trial
court abused its discretion by not allowing individual inquiry of two jurors
who could not unequivocally state that they were able to set aside their
preformed opinions.8 9
The Boggs court reasoned that individual voir dire was compelled as a
result of the timing and content of the pretrial publicity as well as the

76. See id. at 1351.
77. See id. at 1351 n.8. The victim's death occurred eighteen months before the trial began
and, at that time, there were numerous reports regarding the victim's death. See id.

78. See id. These news reports regarded the fact that a mistrial had resulted from the first
attempt to select a jury for the defendant's trial. See id.
79. See id. at 1351.

80. See id.
81. See id. at 1351-52.

82. See id.
83. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 415.
84. See Pietri,644 So. 2d at 1351.
85. 862 F.2d 1504 (1989).
86. See Pietri,644 So. 2d at 1351.
87. 667 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1996).
88. See id. at 767. The three jurors were asked if they were willing and able to render a
verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial. See ia Two were equivocal as to their ability
to set aside preformed opinions and one personally knew potential witnesses in the case. See id.
89. See id. at 768.
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admission of the jurors that they had preformed opinions.' The court
reasoned that more extensive questioning would have allowed the trial
court to determine the extent of the potential jurors' knowledge of the case
and properly evaluate whether their preformed opinions could be set
aside.91
2. Juror Competency
During the voir dire process, the trial court must ascertain whether each
individual juror is competent to sit on the jury and, if a juror is found
incompetent, that juror must be excused for cause by the trial court.9' The
test for juror competency has been set forth by the Florida Supreme Court
as "whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his
verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law
given to him by the court."' In order to apply this test, Florida trial courts
must follow the rule that "if there is basis for any reasonable doubt as to
any juror's possessing that state of mind which will enable him to render
an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence submitted and the law
announced at trial[,] he should be excused on motion of a party, or by the
court on its own motion." 94 Therefore, a trial court must conclude beyond

90. See id. The court distinguished Pietri,644 So. 2d at 1351 (Fla. 1994). In Pietri,the trial
judge readily excused jurors who stated they had formed an opinion regarding the case, and thus
the defendant was not forced to exercise peremptory challenges on jurors admitting to preformed
bias. See Boggs, 667 So. 2d at 768.
91. See Boggs, 667 So. 2d at 768.
92. Section 913.03 of the Florida Statutes specifies the grounds available for which a juror
may be challenged for cause. In Florida state courts, if a defendant is forced to utilize a peremptory
challenge on ajuror who should have been excused for cause, and the defendant is subsequently
denied a request for additional peremptory challenges, then the trial court committed reversible
error. See Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla. 1985).
93. Hill, 477 So. 2d at 555 (citing Lusk v. State, 466 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1984)).
94. Id. (citing Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 24 (Fla. 1959)). In Singer,the Florida Supreme
Court stated,

mhe goal to be sought is ajury composed of persons whose minds are free of any
preconceived opinions of the guilt or innocence of an accused, persons who can
in fact give to an accused the full benefit of the presumption of innocence, persons
who can because of the freedom from knowledge of the cause decide it solely on
the evidence submitted and the law announced at the trial.
Singer, 109 So. 2d at 23. Singerwas decided in 1959, prior to the Florida Supreme Court's opinion
in Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (1985), which held that "the mere existence of a preconceived
notion as to guilt or innocence is insufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's
impartiality." d at 20 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,723 (1961)).
The Florida Supreme Court in Hill, decided five months after the publication of Bundy,
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a reasonable doubt that each juror is able to set aside any preconceived
opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence.95
However, the Florida Supreme Court has established a situation in
which a juror must per se be excused for cause. In Reilly v. State,9 6 the

Florida Supreme Court found reversible error when the defendant was
forced to exercise a peremptory challenge on a juror who had read an
inadmissible confession, even though the juror stated he had not formed an
opinion.97 The Reilly court reasoned that the inadmissible information
rendered the pretrial publicity so prejudicial that "it is unrealistic to believe
that during the course of deliberations [the exposed potential juror] could
have entirely disregarded his knowledge of the confession no matter how
hard he tried." 98

C. Change of Venue-Actual Prejudice
The trial judge must also determine whether actual prejudice to the
defendant has been demonstrated through the process of voir dire. 9 As jury

never mentioned Bundy, and after citing Singer, went so far as to affirmearly rulings by the Florida
Supreme Court that "jurors should if possible be not only impartial, but beyond even the suspicion
of partiality." Hill, 477 So. 2d at 556 (citing O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215,222 (1860)). Although,
notably, Bundy and Irvin were addressing the separate issue of whether change of venue should
have been granted, these fundamental ideals of juror impartiality promulgated by Singer and Hill
would appear to have been specifically rejected not only as "an impossible standard" by the United
States Supreme Court in Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722-23, but also by the Florida Supreme Court's opinion
in Bundy, 471 So. 2d at 19-20.
95. As a result of the court's ruling in Hill, trial judges must recognize that, although the
Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that even ajuror exposed to pretrial publicity is
still qualified, so long as any preconceived opinions can be set aside, the juror's impartiality must
still be proven beyond a reasonabledoubt. See Bundy, 471 So. 2d at 20; Pietri,644 So. 2d at 1352.
96. 557 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 1990).
97. See id. at 1367.
98. Id. Within the circumstance of an inadmissible confession being reported in the media,
the distinction between the law regarding change of venue and this rule of Reilly, regarding juror
competency, must be recognized. In Holsworth v. State, 522 So. 2d 348, 351 (Fla. 1988), the
Florida Supreme Court held that publicity about a confession is not per se grounds for change of
venue. In order for a defendant to prove that a change of venue is warranted under those
circumstances, the defendant must demonstrate either that the particular jury was affected by the
pretrial publicity or prove that the general state of mind of the community was so infected that a fair
trial was impossible. See id. Therefore, under Holsworth, 522 So. 2d at 351, if an inadmissible
confession is broadcast in the news media, change of venue is not necessary unless the defendant's
seated jury was affected. However, under Reilly, 557 So. 2d at 1367, if a prospective juror read
about the inadmissible confession, then that juror must be excused for cause per se.
99. See Cummings v. Dugger, 862 F.2d 1504, 1509 (11th Cir. 1989) (explaining that actual
prejudice results when it is determined thatjurors who decided the defendant's case could not have,
under the circumstances, set aside their preformed opinions); see also Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d
278, 285 (Fla. 1997) ("If voir dire shows that it is impossible to select jurors who will decide the
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selection proceeds, a pattern of deep and bitter prejudice may be presumed
to be present throughout the community based on the number ofjurors who
admit to having a fixed opinion as to the defendant's guilt."° If so, then
even if remaining jurors assert their ability to set aside any preformed
opinions, the trial judge must evaluate these assertions under the totality
of the circumstances.10 1
The general rule in Florida is that the mere existence of pretrial
publicity is insufficient to raise a presumption of unfairness of
constitutional magnitude.' 2 In Pietriv. State, the Florida Supreme Court
set forth the test to determine whether change of venue is warranted under
the circumstances as follows:
The test is whether the general state of mind of the inhabitants
of a community is so infected by knowledge of the incident
and accompanying prejudice, bias, and preconceived opinions
that jurors could not possibly put these matters out of their
minds and try the case solely upon the evidence presented in
the courtroom.'0 3
A two-prong analysis for determining whether change of venue is
required was later formulated by the Florida Supreme Court in Rolling v.
State,"° and recently reaffirmed in Fosterv. State.05 Under this analysis,
the trial court must evaluate first the "extent and nature of any pretrial
publicity, and second the difficulty encountered in actually selecting a
jury."1 "6The percentage of prospective jurors who admit to a fixed opinion
case on the basis of the evidence, rather than the jurors' extrinsic knowledge, then a change of
venue is required.").
100. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,727-28 (1961).
101. "No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial....
Where so many fjurors], so many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can
be given little weight." Id. at 728. However, in Murphy v. Florida,421 U.S. 794, 802-03 (1975),
the United States Supreme Court did hold that the jury selection process did not demand an
inference of actual prejudice after setting forth factors relevant in evaluating jurors' assurances of
impartiality. Indicia of impartiality in the juror's response; whether the general atmosphere in the
courtroom and community is sufficiently inflammatory; the timing and factual nature of the news
reports; the number of jurors excused for cause as a result of pretrial publicity; and the extent to
which the trial court must go in order to actually select ajuror are factors relevant to the evaluation
of a juror's protestation of impartiality. See id.
102. See Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 19 (Fla. 1985).
103. 644 So. 2d 1347, 1352 (Fla. 1994) (citing McCaskill v. State, 344 So. 2d 1276, 1278
(Fla. 1977)).
104. 695 So. 2d 278, 285 (Fla. 1997).

105. 25 Fla. L. Weekly S667, S668 (Fla. 2000).
106. Rolling, 695 So. 2dat 285. Factors set forth by theRollingcourt for evaluating the nature

and effect of any pretrial publicity on the impartiality of prospective jurors were: the length oftime
between the commission of the crime, the trial, and when the majority ofthe publicity occurred; the
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or extrinsic knowledge of the case can be used to determine whether
pervasive community prejudice should be presumed; if presumed, this
pervasive prejudice would thereby invalidate other jurors' assurances of
impartiality and result in an inference of actual prejudice to the
defendant. 7 Hence, a trial court may conclude that such a "wave of public
passion" is evidenced by the jury selection process and, as a result, the
defendant's due process rights mandate a change of venue.108

ELI.

BOLIN V. STATE

A. Facts

Oscar Ray Bolin, Jr. was tried for the murder of Teri Lynn Matthews
in Pasco County, Florida."0 9 During the weekend prior to trial and on the
dayjury selection began, articles were published in local newspapers which
contained inadmissible and prejudicial information, including information
regarding prior convictions." 0 Defense counsel sought twice by pretrial

factual or biased nature of the publicity; the size of the community in which the trial is being held;
and whether the defendant exercised all of his peremptory strikes. See Id.
107. See id.
108. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,728 (1961).
109. See Bolin v. State, 736 So. 2d 1160,1161 (Fla. 1999). This trial, which resulted in adeath
sentence, was Bolin's second trial, as his first conviction was reversed by the Florida Supreme
Court due to the improper admission of evidence. See id.
110. See id. at 1162. On Saturday, the Tampa Tribune ran an article stating:
During the first trial, Phillip Bolin was a willing witness for the state, and his
testimony played an important part in putting Oscar Bolin, now 34, on death
row .... All three convictions were reversed in 1995 by the Florida Supreme
Court, which ruled the trial judge erred in allowing testimony of Bolin's former
wife, who is now deceased, as to what Oscar Bolin had told her about the killings.
Id. A St. PetersburgTimes article published the same weekend stated:
Bolin, a 34-year-old carnival worker, was convicted of Mathews' murder and of
killing two other women in Hillsborough County, but the convictions were
overturned by the state Supreme Court, taking Bolin off death row. In Bolin's
trials for the 1986 murders of Natalie Blanche Holley, 25, and Stephanie Collins,
17, his ex-wife, Cheryl Jo Colby, testified that he had confessed to the killings. A
conviction in the Mathews case was based in part on Bolin's previous convictions.

Id. Another article in the Tampa Tribune ran the day ofjury selection:
Bolin was convicted in 1992 in Teri's death. Juries also found him guilty of
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motion to conduct individual and sequestered voir dire concerning trialrelated publicity."' When jury selection commenced, defense counsel
again moved for individual voir dire of each prospective juror who
admitted reading newspaper articles about Bolin's case, but the trial judge
denied the request.1 2 Alternatively, the trial judge allowed proffered
questions to be asked in a questionnaire which was completed by all
prospective jurors in lieu of individual voir dire." 3 As a result of this initial
screening
process, seventeen prospective jurors were excused by the trial
4
judge.11

The first panel of remaining jurors was then asked collectively by the
State whether anyone had read about the case."' When five jurors raised
their hands, the State then asked if anyone would be unable to render a
verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial, and no juror raised
his hand." 6 Defense counsel subsequently asked if any juror had formed
an opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence and, if so, whether that

murdering two young Hillsborough women and the 34-year-old former truck
driver was sentenced to die in the electric chair in all three cases. But while he sat
on death row, Bolin's convictions were overturned .... [The victim's mother was
quoted as saying:] 'How do you get three murder convictions and not be guilty of
something? I brought my child up to obey the law and to trust it. This is a sham
ofjustice. And it's draining the life out of all of us. If he gets out, he'll kill again.
It will be someone else's daughter. It will be someone else's sister.'
Id. at 1162-63. A separate article published by the Tampa Tribune the same day contained the
following information:
Accused serial killer Oscar Ray Bolin's retrial begins today in New Port Richey
under tight security. The 34-year-old former truck-driver [sic] was convicted in
1992 and sentenced to die for killing 26-year-old Ten Lynn Mathews. But the
Florida Supreme Court overturned that murder conviction and two others from
Hillsborough County ....
From his jail cell in 1990, Bolin was accused of
plotting to kidnap the wives of the Hillsborough sheriff and two other officers.
Id. at 1163.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. The questionnaire consisted of questions submitted by defense counsel that
otherwise would have been asked during individual voir dire; these questions inquired as to each
prospective juror's exposure to pretrial publicity, although the exact questions were not specified
in the court's opinion. See id.
114. See id. The responses by these jurors indicated that the jurors had "some knowledge of
the defendant and as a result of that knowledge that they would not be able to serve with an open
mind and render.., an impartial decision based only on the law and the evidence." Id.
115. See id.
116. See iL
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opinion could be set aside. 7 No juror responded."' The second panel of
jurors was only asked by defense counsel whether anyone who had

indicated exposure to pretrial publicity felt that his or her opinion was so

strong as to render the juror unable to set the opinion aside." 9 Again, no

juror responded."
Therefore, during voir dire, no prospective juror indicated that he or she
could not render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial.121
However, at the end of jury selection, five jurors remained on the jury
panel who had been exposed to pretrial publicity. Defense counsel
unsuccessfully challenged the entirejury panel based on prejudice resulting
from "probable juror awareness of Bolin's prior convictions." 23 Bolin was
subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. 24
B. Opinion of the FloridaSupreme Court
On direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court,'25 Bolin claimed he was
denied his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. 26 He argued that he was
erroneously forced to exercise peremptory challenges onjurors exposed to
pretrial publicity.

27

Furthermore, he alleged that five seated jurors had

prior knowledge of the case which possibly included knowledge of
inadmissible facts contained in the newspaper articles. 28 The court held
that the trial judge abused its discretion in denying Bolin's motion for

117. See id
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id
121. See id
122. See id. at 1163-64. Defense counsel challenged six prospective jurors for cause based
upon his inability to discern the jurors' suitability without specific inquiry into their exposure to
pretrial publicity. See id. The cause challenges were denied and defense counsel subsequently
exercised peremptory strikes on two of the six previously challenged venirepersons. See id. at 1164.
In the second round of challenges, after unsuccessfully challenging one juror for cause based on
his exposure to pretrial publicity, defense counsel exercised a peremptory strike to excuse the juror.
See id.The trial judge denied defense counsel's request for additional peremptories that would have
been used to strike jurors remaining on the panel who indicated prior knowledge of Bolin's case.
See id.
123. Id.
124. Seeid. at 1161.
125. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (providing that all convictions resulting in a sentence of
death are subject to automatic review by the Florida Supreme Court).
126. See Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1164.
127. See id
128. See id.
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and death sentence
individual voir dire.'2 9 Consequently, his conviction
130
were reversed and a new trial was granted.
The court found that, similar to the defendant in Boggs,131 Bolin was
erroneously forced to use peremptory challenges on jurors exposed to
pretrial publicity. 132 The court reasoned that although the jurors stated they
had no preformed opinions, Reilly 33 established that even a juror without
a preformed opinion should be excused for cause if exposed to pretrial
publicity containing inadmissible information. 34 Without individual voir
dire, the trial court in Bolin was left to speculate as to the substance of the
jurors' pretrial exposure and whether the jurors had knowledge of
prejudicial and inadmissible information. 35 Because the trial court did not
conduct individual voir dire to discover whether jurors had been exposed
36
to inadmissible information, the trial court abused its discretion.
The Bolin court added a caveat to the traditional rule that the decision
to conduct individual voir dire is in the broad discretion of the trial
judge. 37 The court's analysis began with acknowledgment of the trial
court's discretion, but then cited Boggs 38 as a case in which individual voir
dire was compelled under the facts. 39 The court ruled that in order for a
trial court to discern the effect of any adverse publicity on potential jurors,
the preferred approach for Florida courts is to conduct individual voir dire
when pretrial publicity creates the probability that prospective jurors were
exposed to inadmissible information." 4 In so doing, the court cited the
decision 1of
the Eleventh Circuit in Cummings v. Dugger141 with
42
approval.
According to the Bolin opinion, trial courts continue to maintain
discretion in the conduct of voir dire, however, they must consider the
timing and content of the pretrial publicity in deciding whether to conduct
individual voir dire.' 4 The trial court must ascertain whether prospective
jurors possess knowledge of inadmissible evidence which is so prejudicial

129. Seeid. at 1166.

130. See id.
131. Boggs, 667 So. 2d at 768.

132. See Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1166.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Reilly, 557 So. 2d at 1367.
See Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1164-65.
See id. at 1165.
See id. at 1166.

137. See id
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Boggs, 667 So. 2d at 765.
See Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1164.
See id. at 1165.
862 F.2d 1504 (11 th Cir. 1989).
See Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1165.
See id.
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that the jurors' exposure creates doubt as to whether they could base their
decision solely upon the evidence presented at trial. 144
C. Analysis
The Bolin court partly rested its finding of error on Boggs 45 and
reasoned that, although the jurors in Bolin's case hadformed no opinions
as to Bolin's guilt, no individual voir dire was conducted which would
have revealed juror exposure to inadmissible or prejudicial information. 45
However, under the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court in Mu'Min,
this depth of questioning is not required by the Constitution. 47 The
publicity in Mu'Min contained inadmissible and prejudicial information,
such as prior convictions, 4 just as the publicity in Bolin.t49 Yet, the
Mu'Mn Court held that the critical inquiry is whether the trial judge is to
believe a potential juror when he states that he has not formed an opinion
regarding the case.15 Although content questioning may be helpful in
making this determination, it is not constitutionally required.' Clearly, the
Florida Supreme Court could have based its heightened standard on Florida
constitutional due process, yet the court declined to take this approach.
Instead, the court based its decision on federal circuit court decisions
published prior to Mu'Min v. Virginia.
The Florida Supreme Court quoted the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in
Cummingsas follows: "'The preferred approach in such cases, as discussed
in [United States v. Davis], is to conduct individual examination of the
jurors. Individual voir dire allows the trial court to probe the effect of any
adverse publicity on the juror and insulates the jurors from one another's
prejudicial comments.""5 " This quotation ended at a critical juncture,
of the Eleventh
Circuit's
pointedly leaving out the most significant portion153
ddo
analysis-the specific recognition that the Davis court did not go so far

144. See id.
145. Boggs, 667 So. 2d at 765.

146. See Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1164.
147. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 431. In Mu'Min, eight of the seated jurors had been exposed to
pretrial publicity and no precise inquiries were made about the content, yet the trial court's decision
not to conduct individual voir dire was upheld. Id. at 421.
148. Seeid. at418.
149. See Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1162.
150. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S at 425.
151. See id. The Bolin decision has effectively eliminated the jurors' actual responses

regarding their impartiality as a factor in a trial court's decision to conduct individual voir dire.
Now, regardlessof the jurors' actual responses, the trial court must conduct individual voir dire
to determine ifjurors have been exposed to inadmissible and prejudicial information.
152. Bolin,736 So. 2d at 1165 (quoting Cummings, 862 F.2d at 1507-08).
153. United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1978).
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as to establish a rule requiring individual voir dire in high profile cases. 54
The Cummings court emphasized the trial court's need for flexibility in the
questioning of potential jurors as to possible prejudice, 55 and subsequently
held that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion by not conducting
56
individual voir dire.
The reasoning that supported the Bolin court's decision was more
closely related to the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Davis. 7 The circuit court
held that under certain circumstances where the nature of the publicity as
a whole raises a significant possibility of prejudice, individual examination
of prospective jurors is required for the trial court to make sufficient
inquiry into the juror's impartiality.' 58 Similarly, the Bolin court ruled that
trial courts must consider the timing and content of pretrial publicity in
determining whether to conduct individual voir dire.'59 Florida trial courts
are now required to ascertain whetherjurors were exposed to inadmissible
information so prejudicial that the exposure creates doubt as to whether the
jurors can be impartial." The Bolin court found that this determination
could not have been made absent individual voir dire,' 61just as the Fifth
Circuit's ruling in Davis required individual voir dire under certain
circumstances. 62
The conflict that existed between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits prior
to Mu'Mn on the issue of individual voir dire and pretrial publicity was
specifically acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court in
Mu'Min 63 As a result of the conflict among circuits, the Mu'Min Court
addressed the constitutional issue of whether individual voir dire with
specific questioning in regards to pretrial publicity exposure is required
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.16 The Court held that the
Constitution does not require such content questioning. 65 The Florida
Supreme Court's ruling in Bolin' 66 imposes a higher standard on trial

154. See Cummings, 862 F.2d at 1508.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1509.

157. Davis,583 F.2d at 190; see alsoMu'Min, 500 U.S. at 426 (recognizing the Fifth Circuit's
ruling in United States v. Davis that under some circumstances an inquiry as to the content of the
publicity is required).
158. See Davis,583 F.2d at 196-98.
159. See Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1166.
160. See id.
161. Seeid
162. See Davis, 583 F.2d at 198.
163. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at426.

164. Id. at 424-25.
165. See id.
166. Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1165-66.
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courts in determining juror impartiality than is required under the Sixth
Amendment.
However, dicta found in the Mu'Min opinion potentially could have
supported Bolin. The Mu'Min Court stated, "Had the trial court in this case
been confronted with the 'wave of public passion' engendered by pretrial
publicity.., the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might
well have required more extensive examination of potential jurors than it
undertook here."' 67 This language would allow trial courts to utilize an
actual prejudice standard, set forth in Irvin' s in the context of a change of
venue issue, for determining if individual voir dire is required under the
circumstances.169 The Florida Supreme Court could have utilized this dicta
in Mu'Min and arrived at the same conclusion, if an analysis of the pretrial
publicity led the court to find a "wave of public passion." Therefore, the
Bolin court's reliance on circuit court opinions published prior to the
170
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Mu'Min was not necessary.

167. 500 U.S. at 429 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,728 (1961)). The Mu'Min Court
acknowledged that under certain circumstances, adverse publicity similar to the level of publicity
in Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728, can create a presumption of prejudice in the jurors which should prevent
the trial court from believing ajuror's response that he can be impartial. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at
429.
168. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728.
169. This implementation of a principle set forth in Irvin, regarding the issue of change of
venue in the context of the issue of individual voir dire creates an interesting question. If the level
of pretrial publicity does not amount to a "wave of public passion," then under Mu'Mn, individual
voir dire is not constitutionally mandated unless the failure to ask specific content questions renders
the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. 500 U.S. at 425-26. If the level of pretrial publicity does
amount to a "wave of public passion," then according to dicta in Mu'Min, a more extensive
examination of the prospective jurors may be constitutionally mandated under those circumstances.
Id. at 429. Yet, is this dicta of the Mu'Min Court obsolete due to Irvin, 366 U.S. at 727-28, which
held that if the jury selection process evidences a "wave of public passion," prejudice must be
presumed, and therefore, the actual prejudice standard would mandate change of venue regardless
of whether individual voir dire was conducted?
170. However, if the court's unwritten motivation was to impose a rule dictating individual
voir dire, then the court would not have wanted to follow this dicta in Mu'Mn because of the strong
showing required to prove a "wave of public passion." See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728 (finding a wave
of public passion after two-thirds of the jury panel admitted to believing the defendant guilty prior
to hearing any testimony); Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 427-29 (distinguishing the extraordinary publicity
in Irvin, 366 U.S. at 727, from the publicity in Mu'Min). Further, the incorporation of a standard
formulated in the context of change of venue would implicate other principles set forth in Bundy
v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), and Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), into decisions regarding
the voir dire process, and this is exactly what the Florida Supreme Court sought to completely
discourage in Kessler v. State, 752 So. 2d 545, 552 (1999).
The ultimate question to ask is why didn't the court simply demand a higher standard
based on the Florida Constitution and thus, Florida trial judges would be fully aware of their lack
of discretion in the voir dire process in a high publicity trial? Why did the court risk ignoring the
Supreme Court's precedent established in Mu'Min, when the court could have justifiably imposed
a rule mandating individual voir dire?
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Another issue is the Bolin court's citation for the general rule that trial

judges have discretion in the decision of whether individual voir dire is
necessary. Curiously, the court cited Rolling v. State' for the rule as
follows: "Such publicity is normal in cases with extreme public interest,

see Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 285 (Fla. 1997), and we continue to
adhere to our holding that the decision as to individual and sequestered
'
voir dire is a discretionary decision for the trial judge (no citation)."172
Observing the way in which the sentence was drafted, it appears that the
court was citing Rolling for its holding that the decision to conduct
individual voir dire is a discretionary decision for the trial judge.173
However, the issue of individual voir dire was not raised on appeal in
Rolling and the Florida Supreme Court's opinion never discussed whether
individual voir dire on the subject of pretrial publicity was conducted. 74
The court, in its opinion affirming Rolling's death sentence, simply stated,
"In both phases [of panel questioning], prospective jurors were reminded
that they could respond to the questions privately to the court and counsel
outside the presence of other panel members. The record reflects that
throughout the process, the trial court gave the attorneys wide latitude in
An Alabama state court decision, similar to Bolin, was reversed and remanded by the
United States Supreme Court afterMu'Min was decided. See Brown v. State, 571 So. 2d 345 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1990). In 1990, prior to the publication of the Mu'Min opinion, the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Alabama decided Brown. Id. The defendant argued on appeal that the trial judge erred
by refusing to allow individual voir dire concerning pretrial publicity. See id. at 347. Previously,
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama had adopted the rule set forth in Jordanv. Lippman, 763
F.2d 1265 (11 th Cir. 1985), that pretrial publicity which raises a significant possibility of prejudice
necessitates individual voir dire. See Brown, 571 So. 2d at 350. Therefore, the court dealt solely
with the issue of whether the pretrial publicity had raised a significant possibility of prejudice. See
id. The court found that the pretrial publicity was extensive and included mostly inadmissible
information. See id. at 350-51. The court then reasoned,
since the trial judge's voir dire examination of the jury venire was inadequate to
allow him to make an independent determination as to whether the jurors'
impartiality had been destroyed by the extensive and prejudicial publicity in this
case, we must reverse the judgment and remand this case to the trial court.
Id. at 352.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated this Alabama decision. See Alabama
v. Brown, 501 U.S. 1201, 1201 (1991). The case was remanded to the Court of Criminal Appeals
of Alabama to be reconsidered in light of Mu'Min. See id. The Brown and Bolin decisions are so
similar that the reversal of Brown indicates that the Supreme Court would likely reverse Bolin as
well, to be reconsidered in light of Mu'Min.
171. 695 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1997).
172. Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1166 (emphasis added).
173. See id.
174. Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 283. Although the court in Fosterv.State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S667,
S669 (Fla. 2000), noted that individual voir dire regarding pretrial publicity was conducted in
Rolling's trial, the Rolling court did not specifically rely on that fact in its decision.
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questioningprospectivejurors."7 5 The Rolling court never held that the
decision to conduct individual voir dire is in the discretion of the trial
court.
Lastly, the Bolin court failed to recognize or attach any significance to
the trial court's jury questionnaire." The questionnaire functioned as an
initial screening of the jury panel, inquiring as to each juror's exposure to
pretrial publicity.' "7 This screening subsequently led to the elimination of
seventeen jurors from the jury panel, yet this fact was wholly ignored by
the court.' The existence of the questionnaire contradicts the court's
finding that the trial court was "left to speculate about what these jurors
had learned from these newspaper accounts."' 179
The Bolin decision left open the question of whether trial judges facing
highly publicized trials really had any discretion left to decide whether to
conduct individual voir dire. Although the Florida Supreme Court still
acknowledged the discretion of the trial court, the court's ruling in Bolin
seemed to eliminate any discretion that was once granted to the trial
judges. Florida case law had effectively been reverted back to the uncertain
state which existed prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Mu'Min. 8 ' However, the Florida Supreme Court's later decision in Kessler
v. State assured trial judges that they had, in fact, lost all discretion.
IV. KESSLER V. STATE

A. Facts
Berry Kessler was tried for the murder of John Deroo in Pasco County,
Florida.' 8' Twice 82 Kessler unsuccessfully moved the trial court to conduct

175. Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
176. The court simply found that without individual voir dire, neither the trial court nor
counsel could know whether the jurors had been exposed to inadmissible and prejudicial
information. See Bolin, 736 So. 2d 1160, 1166 (Fla. 1999).
177. See id. at 1162. The questionnaire contained questions submitted by both the prosecutor
and defense counsel which would have been posed during individual voir dire. See id. at 1163.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 1164. Questionnaires have been recognized as providing an opportunity for an "indepth exploration of the source, extent, and content of media exposure for each potential juror with
a minimum of the court's time." Wetherington, supra note 13, at 471 n.263. Although
questionnaires do not allow an observation of the juror's demeanor in regards to his assertion of
impartiality, see id., the Bolin court did not cite this disadvantage as a reason for ignoring the
existence of the questionnaire. Cf. Kessler v. State, 752 So. 2d 545, 551 (1999) (specifically noting
that individual voir dire was necessary, despite a brief questionnaire, so that defense counsel could
gauge whether (1) thejuror had focused closely on, and fully understood, the publicity he read, (2)

the jurors' "gut-level reaction to the article," and (3) whether the juror found the article credible).
180. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 415.
181. Kessler,752 So. 2d at 545. Kessler was tried not only in the same circuit court as Bolin,
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individual and sequestered voir dire for the purpose of discovering the
veniremen's knowledge of the case derived from exposure to pretrial
publicity. 83 However, the trial court did agree to require that the jurors
complete a brief questionnaire.' The questionnaire consisted of three
questions 185 intended to reveal whether the jurors were familiar with any
of the trial's participants, and, if so, whether the jurors felt that they would
still be able to render an impartial verdict. 86
On the second day of jury selection, a newspaper article was published
that contained information regarding Kessler's prior criminal record and
suspected criminal activity.'87 Although the trial court refused to question
the jury panel collectively as to whether anyone had read the article, 8
but also before the same circuit court judge, Hon. William R. Webb. See id. at 552 n.10.
182. Kessler moved once pretrial and once during voir dire. See id. at 547.
183. See id.The opinion does not reveal the content or pervasiveness of the publicity that was
promulgated prior to trial.
184. See id. at 547-48.
185. The three questions were:
1. Are you familiar with any of the individual(s) whose name(s) are set forth in this
questionnaire? If yes, please state the individual(s) with whom you are familiar.
2. Have you read or heard anything about any of the above-named individual(s) or the
charges alleged against the above named defendant?

- Yes -

No If your answer is

"yes" please answer question number 3 below.
3. If your answer to question 2 was "yes", do you: (mark appropriate answer)
a. feel that you can put aside anything that you have read or heard about this case and
serve with an open mind and reach a verdict based only on the law and evidence
presented during the trial? or,
b. feel that, as a result of what you have read or heard about this case, you will not be
able to serve with an open mind and render an impartial decision based only on the
law and the evidence presented at trial?
Id. at 548 n.6.
186. See id. at 548.
187. See id. On December 10, 1996, the following article, entitled "Murder-for-hire trial starts
today," was published in the St. PetersburgTimes:
"[Subtitle:] The state is pursuing charges against a defendant who has already
been convicted in federal court ofkilling a Hudson cabinetmaker. [Text:] The trial
is unusual for a number or [sic] reasons, chief among them that Kessler already
has been convicted in federal court in the killing of Hudson cabinetmaker John
Deroo and an Ohio businessman. Kessler is serving a life sentence in prison with
no possibility of parole .... He was arrested two years [after the killing of Deroo]
and convicted of trying to arrange a second hit on another business partner, who
was involved in a pornography shop with Kessler in Columbus, Ohio. At the time,
Columbus police said Kessler had been a suspect in at least five other slayings of
business associates. The cases have never been solved."
Id. (quoting T. Christian Miller, Murder-for-HireTrial Starts Today, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Dec. 10, 1997, at IB).
188. See id. at 548-49.
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juror Mengel revealed during voir dire that he had read the St. Petersburg
Times article'89 in its entirety."9 The trial judge, defense counsel, and
prosecutor asked juror Mengel repeatedly whether he had formed an
opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Kessler and he continuously
responded that he had not.' 9'
Defense counsel requested that juror Mengel be excused for cause,192
but the trial court denied the request. 193 Defense counsel had already
exhausted all peremptory challenges at the time of the request and the trial
court refused to grant defense counsel additional peremptories. 194 As a
result,juror Mengel sat on the jury 95 that convicted Kessler of first-degree
murder and sentenced him to death.' 96
B. Opinion of the FloridaSupreme Court
On direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, 97 the dispositive issue
raised by Kessler was whether the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his for-cause challenge of juror Mengel.' 98 The Florida Supreme
Court held that the trial court committed reversible error by not excusing
juror Mengel after the trial court "failed to allow adequate screening of
prospective jurors concerning pretrial publicity."' 99
The court regarded the following facts to be significant: (1) the
newspaper article was fresh in juror Mengel's mind, as it had been
published on the second day of jury selection; (2) the article contained
extraordinarily prejudicial information;" 0 (3) the majority of the
189. Although juror Mengel responded during voir dire that he had read the PascoTimes and
not the St. PetersburgTimes, see id.at 549, throughout the Florida Supreme Court's opinion, the

court regarded the St. PetersburgTimes article to be the article which juror Mengel had read.
190. See id. The trial court asked juror Mengel how he had gained his knowledge regarding
Kessler's trial (which he had indicated on the questionnaire) and he responded that he had read the
entire article that morning. See id.
191. See id. At several points during the questioning, juror Mengel affirmatively stated, "I
didn't form an opinion." Id.

192. The Kessler opinion did not include the argument made by defense counsel to the trial
court as to why, specifically, juror Mengel should have been excused for cause.
193. See Kessler, 752 So. 2d at 549.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 546.
197. See supranote 125.
198. See Kessler, 752 So. 2d at 547.

199. Id. at 546.
200. The court reasoned that the information was extraordinarilyprejudicial because the

article stated that (1) Kessler had already been convicted in federal court of the very crime for which
he was on trial for in state court and was serving a life sentence without parole; (2) Kessler's prior
conviction for contracting a murder, and (3) he was suspected in five other unsolved murders. See
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information contained in the article was inadmissible; and (4)juror Mengel
read the article in full."' In light of these facts, the court held that
individual voir dire was required in order for the trial court to have
sufficient information to find juror Mengel impartial beyond a reasonable
doubt.2 2
The court relied upon the rule that a "juror should be excused if there
is any reasonable doubt about the juror's ability to render an impartial
verdict., 20 3 The court cited the Boggs"° andBolin2°5 decisions as cases that
involved a similar pretrial publicity issue and were reversed because the
trial judges refused to conduct individual voir dire. 2°6 The court also cited
Reilly ° for its ruling that when a prospective juror is exposed to highly
prejudicial information prior to trial, that juror must be excused for cause,
regardless of his assertion of impartiality. 2 8 Based upon these three
decisions, the court established the following rule: "When a prospective
juror has been recently exposed to pretrial media reports containing highly
damaging inadmissible information (such as that in the present case), the
preferred practice is to permit individual and sequestered voir dire to
determine the extent of juror bias.' ' 2 9

Because the trial court did not allow individual and sequestered voir
dire, defense counsel was unable to develop an accurate picture of the
impact of the article on juror Mengel.2 ' 0 The lack of individual voir dire
prevented defense counsel from being able to evaluate the emotional
reaction of juror Mengel to this news article. 21 As a result, the court held
id. at 551.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. ld. at 550 (quoting Turner v. State, 645 So. 2d 444,447 (Fla. 1994)). The court further

noted that the trial court's decision as to ajuror's impartiality will be reversed only upon a showing
of abuse of discretion. See id.
204. Boggs, 667 So. 2d at 765.

205. Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1160.
206. See Kessler, 752 So. 2d at 552. After citing the rules regarding juror competency, the
court turned immediately to its discussion of Bolin and Boggs. See iUtThis discussion, however,
consisted solely of a lengthy quotation of the Bolin decision. See id. at 550-51. The court provided

no reasoning as to why those two cases were applicable other than to mention that in none of the
cases was individual voir dire conducted. See id. at 550. Nor did the court explain why the Boggs

decision was considered by the court to be "directly on point." Id. at 552 n.10.
207. Reilly v. State, 557 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 1990).
208. See Kessler, 752 So. 2d at 552. "[I]t is unrealistic to believe that during the course of
deliberations [the juror] could have entirely disregarded his knowledge of the confession no matter

how hard he tried. Thus, we conclude that reversible error was committed by the failure to excuse
[the juror] for cause." UL (quoting Reilly, 557 So. 2d at 1367).
209. Id.
210. See id. at 551.
211. See id. The court stated that individual voir dire would have enabled defense counsel to
gauge (1) whether juror Mengel had focused closely while reading the article; (2) whether he
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that the trial court did not have sufficient information before it to find juror
Mengel impartial beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 2 Thus, the trial judge
2 13
abused his discretion by refusing to excuse juror Mengel for cause.
Furthermore, the court held that juror Mengel's assertion of impartiality
was an insufficient basis for the trial court's finding of competency, based
on the court's prior decision in Reilly.214
Lastly, the court specifically rejected the State's argument that the court
should apply the principles underlying the decision in Bundy v. State.1 s
Even though the jurors in Bundy knew of the defendant's prior
convictions, 211621
just as the jurors in Kessler, 17 the court held that the Bundy
opinion was inapplicable. 21' The court based its holding on the distinction
that the Bundy court was dealing with the issue of whether venue should
have been changed, not with the issue of whether ajuror should have been
excused for cause.219 The court reasoned that because the "practical and
policy considerations underlying these two issues are vastly different,"'
the change of venue principles enunciated in Bundy "cannot be lifted out
of context and applied to the present case to trump recent decisions of this
Court that are directly on point. ' 22

understood and appreciated the details of the article; (3) whether he found the article credible; and
(4) whether he had a "gut-level reaction to the article." Il
212. See id. at 552.
213. See iL
214. See id.
215. See id. Those principles were:
The mere existence of extensive pretrial publicity is not enough to raise the
presumption of unfairness of a constitutional magnitude.... The mere existence
of a preconceived notion as to guilt or innocence is insufficient to rebut the
presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality. It is sufficient if the juror can lay
aside his opinion or impression and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court.
Id. (quoting Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 19-20 (Fla. 1985)).
216. See Bundy, 471 So. 2d at 20.
217. See Kessler, 752 So. 2d at 549.
218. Seeid. at552.
219. See id.
220. Id. Nowhere did the court discuss those "practical and policy considerations" which were
so vastly different to render principles in the context of change of venue inapplicable to the issue
of whether ajuror should be excused for cause. Further, Section 913.03(10) of the Florida Statutes
specifically states that the formation of an opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of a defendant
is not a sufficient ground for challenging a juror for cause.
221. Id. Although the court did not explicitly state those cases considered to be "directly on
point," the court must have been referring to Bolin v. State, 736 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1999), Boggs v.
State, 667 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1996), and Reilly v. State, 557 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 1990).
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C. Analysis
The initial question raised is: What would have been accomplished by
questioning juror Mengel individually regarding the newspaper article?
Defense counsel and the trial court knew the content of the article that
juror Mengel had read and thus knew exactly what prejudicial and
inadmissible information juror Mengel knew.222 However, the court
reasoned that the lack of individual voir dire prevented defense counsel
from discerning the juror's emotional reaction upon reading the article. 3
The court found error because defense counsel was "unable to gauge ...
whether [juror Mengel] had focused closely on the article when he read it;
whether he had understood and absorbed the details of the article; whether
he had found the article credible; and whether he had experienced a gutlevel reaction to the article." 224
Thus, the Kessler court ruled that individual voir dire is now
mandatory, not only for the purpose of discovering what knowledge each
juror possesses, but to discern the emotional reactions of each juror to the
information. None of the cases cited in the Kessler decision adequately
supports this far-reaching result. Each case relied upon by the Florida
Supreme Court can be distinguished' from Kessler, and the court failed
to explain why these cases were considered "directly on point." 6

222. "[J]uror Mengel read the (St. PetersburgTimes] article in its entirety." Kessler,752 So.
2d at 551. At trial, defense counsel had argued, in regards to its second motion for individual voir
dire,

[Defense counsel] cannot make an educated decision as to whether to strike these
people for cause or peremptorily based on information that [defense counsel is]
unaware of. Just ask them if you know something and can you be fair. We need to
know what they know so we can make an objective decision as to whether they're
being truthful to themselves or not as to any other matters that we ask them
questions about ....

[1]t's obvious that two of these jurors have read the

newspaper article which goes into the federal conviction and the potential of
admissionsmade by the defendant.
Id. at 548 n.7 (emphasis added). So what did defense counsel not know about the publicity to which
those two jurors had been exposed? The Kessler opinion never mentioned any other article juror
Mengel might have read that was unknown to defense counsel.
223. See id. at 552.
224. Id.

225. The following analysis will distinguish the facts of Bolin v. State, 736 So. 2d 1160 (Fla.
1999), and Boggs v. State, 667 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1996), from the circumstances in Kessler. With
regard to Reilly v. State, 557 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 1990), the analysis will show that the holding in

Reilly does not support the result in Kesslerthat individual and sequestered voir dire needed to be
conducted.
226. Kessler, 752 So. 2d at 552.
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First, the facts of Boggs v. State227 are clearly distinguishable from
Kessler. In Boggs, two jurors were equivocal as to whether they could
render an impartial verdict based only on the evidence presented at trial.22
In Kessler, not only did juror Mengel repeatedly state that he had not
formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but he
also affirmed that he would presume Kessler innocent and hold the state
to its burden of proof.229 The Kessler court even recognized the fact that
juror Mengel never equivocated by citing to the Reilly case as a "similar
situation., 23 ° Therefore, the court's reasoning in the Boggs decision was
not applicable to the Kessler decision.
Second, the facts of Bolin v. State23 can be distinguished from the facts
of Kessler.In Bolin, five jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity, yet
neither defense counsel nor the trial court knew the exact content of that
publicity.232 The trial court committed reversible error by not conducting
individual voir dire to ascertain whether the jurors actually possessed such
prejudicial information which would mandate their removal for cause
under the Reilly23 decision.234 In Kessler,the trial court knew the contents
of the article juror Mengel had read;235 thus, the Kessler court was not
concerned with the factual issue raised in Bolin v. State.
Lastly, consider Reilly v. State.236 The Reilly court addressed the same
issue that was dealt with in Kessler: whether a prospective juror should
have been removed for cause after exposure to pretrial publicity.23 7 In
Reilly, one juror knew of an inadmissible confession from the pretrial
publicity, but stated he could set his opinion aside and render an impartial
verdict. 238 Nevertheless, the court held that the mere exposure to the
inadmissible confession warranted that juror's removal. 9 The Reilly court

227. 667 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1996).
228. See id. at 767. One juror stated that it would be difficult to render an unbiased verdict and
she was unsure as to whether she would be able to set aside her preformed feelings about the
defendant. See id.
The other juror stated that she "would certainly try" to base her decision only on

the evidence, despite the fact that she had already formed an opinion as to the defendant's guilt, and
her husband and daughter worked for law enforcement agencies. Id.
229. See Kessler,752 So. 2d at 551.
230. Id.
231. 736 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1999).
232. Seeid. at 1163.
233. Reilly v. State, 557 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 1990).
234. See Bolin,736 So. 2d at 1166 ("[The trial court] could nothaveknown, absent individual
voir dire, whether the five jurors.., had been exposed to the inadmissible and prejudicial

information.").
235. Kessler, 752 So. 2d at 551.
236. 557 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 1990).

237. See id. at 1367.
238. See id.
239. See id.
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never addressed the issue of individual voir dire because the relevant
inquiry was whether the information, which the trial court knew the juror
possessed, was so prejudicial that thejuror needed to be removed for cause
per se.m
The facts in Kessler are indistinguishable from Reilly, but for the
specific content of the pretrial publicity; in Kessler, there was information
of prior convictions,24 and in Reilly, there was an inadmissible
confession.u 2 The issue the Kessler court should have addressed was
whether the information contained in the St. PetersburgTimes article was
so prejudicial that "it is unrealistic to believe that during the course of
deliberations he could have entirely disregarded his knowledge.., no
matter how hard he tried."' 'u If so, then the rule in Reilly would have
mandated thatjuror Mengel be excused for cause per se, not that individual
voir dire was required.2' If the pretrial publicity did not reach the
prejudicial level of the inadmissible confession in Reilly, then pursuant to
the rules of Pietriv. State 5 and Mu'Min v. Virginia," the Kessler court
should have upheld the trial court's decision not to conduct individual voir
dire. The Reilly decision in no way supported the ruling in Kessler that the
preferred approach is to conduct individual voir dire in light of highly
prejudicial pretrial publicity.
Nevertheless, the court abruptly stated, "[biased on our decisions in
Reilly, Boggs, and Bolin we reiteratethe following: [w]hen a prospective
juror has been recently exposed to pretrial media reports containing highly
damaging inadmissible information ...the preferred practice is to permit

individual and sequestered voir dire to determine the extent of juror
bias. 247 Yet, the Kessler court did not "reiterate" any rule previously set
forth in those cases. Instead, the court's holding reached beyond the extent
of any prior Florida Supreme Court rulings.
The Kessler opinion also raises a question as to the strength and effect
of "the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality." ' 8 The United
States Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd24 9 and the Florida Supreme Court

in Bundy v. State2s' clearly stated that the mere existence of a preconceived
opinion is insufficient to rebut this presumption. The Irvin court did,
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See id.
at 1366-67.
See Kessler v. State, 752 So. 2d 545, 550 (Fla. 1999).
557 So. 2d at 1367.
Id.
See id.
644 So. 2d 1347, 1351 (Fla. 1994).
500 U.S. 415,431-32 (1991).
Kessler, 752 So. 2d at 552 (emphasis added).
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,723 (1961).
366 U.S. 717 (1961).
471 So. 2d 9, 20 (Fla. 1985).
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however, still demand that the trial court inquire as to whether the juror's
preconceived opinion is so strong as to render the juror unable to set the
opinion aside. 251 Yet, "[u]nless [the defendant] shows the actual existence
of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of
partiality, the juror need not necessarily be set aside. ' ' 2 Therefore, this
presumption of impartiality remains intact unless the juror has a powerful
and fixed opinion. However, within the context of a juror competency
issue, the standard imposed on a trial court to find a juror impartial is
beyond a reasonable doubt.253 It is difficult to discern the relationship
between this presumption of impartiality, which is not destroyed by the
existence of apreconceived opinion, and the imposition of the highest legal
standard for a trial court to find ajuror impartial.
On the other hand, in Kessler v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held
that rules established in Bundy, 4 which originated in the context of
deciding a change of venue issue, cannot be applied within the context of
juror competency because "the practical and policy considerations
underlying these two issues are vastly different." 5 Does this mean that
within the context of change of venue law, potential jurors are presumed
impartial, but within the context of juror competency law, jurors must be
proven impartial beyond a reasonable doubt by the trial court?
Furthermore, the Kessler court stated that the rules relating to change
of venue cannot be "lifted up out of context" and applied to the
determination of whether ajuror must be excused for cause 6 If the Bundy
court's change of venue rule that the mere existence of a preconceived
opinion will not destroy the presumption of juror impartiality257 cannot
apply in the juror competency decision, will this not logically impact the
result of a change of venue issue? In order for a trial court to determine if
a change of venue is required under an actual prejudice standard, the judge
must consider the difficulty in selecting ajury. 8 If a sufficient number of
jurors are excused for cause, then due process demands that the trial be

251. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723.
252. Id.This language demonstrates that the Court is concerned with a presumption of
partiality being raised within an individualjuror, notjust in the community as a whole which would
mandate a change of venue.
253. See Turner v. State, 645 So. 2d 444,447 (Fla. 1994).

254. "The mere existence of a preconceived notion as to guilt or innocence is insufficient to
rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality." Bundy, 471 So. 2d at 20.
255. Kessler, 752 So. 2d at 52. Note, however, that under FLA. STAT. § 913.03(10) (1999),

"[The formation of an opinion or impression regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall
not be a sufficient ground for challenge to ajuror if he or she declares and the court determines that
he or she can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence."

256. Id.
257. See Bundy, 471 So. 2d at 20.
258. See Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 285 (Fla.1997).
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moved.259 If the relevant inquiry is no longer whether "the juror can lay
aside his opinion or impression and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court," 26° but is whether the juror's impartiality can be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt,261 has not the Kessler court affected the
standards regarding change of venue?
V. CONCLUSION

The immediate and practical effect of the Bolin v. State and Kessler v.
State decisions is to render individual voir dire mandatory in high profile
cases. For if a prospective juror has been exposed to prejudicial pretrial
publicity, then, under Bolin, the trial court must conduct individual voir
dire to ascertain exactly what knowledge the juror possesses. Even if the
trial court is already fully aware of the knowledge the juror possesses,
individual voir dire must still be conducted to gather sufficient information
regarding the juror's mental attitude to prove his impartiality beyond a
reasonable doubt, under Kessler.
The impact of these rulings will be more dramatic than the Florida
Supreme Court cares to admit. The court, in Bolin, acknowledged the time
pressures on trial court calendars, yet stated that the necessary retrial may
have been avoided if the trial court "had taken the time to determine what
factsfewer than ten venirepersonsknew about Bolin's case. ' 262 However,
the consequence of demanding individual voir dire in high publicity cases
is not that the trial court will have to conduct individual voir dire on the
small number ofjurors eventually selected to serve on thejury. The logical
result is that individual voir dire will have to be conducted on, quite
possibly, the entire jury panel in order for the trial court to attain either a
six or twelve-member jury.263 Furthermore, neither the Bolin nor Kessler
decisions were limited to capital cases. 26" Therefore, if his name is
sufficiently publicized in the news media, any criminal defendant will
arguably be entitled to conduct individual voir dire.
But more important than the actual abrogation of the trial courts'
discretion, are the consequences of the Florida Supreme Court's failure to

259. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).
260. Bundy, 471 So. 2d at 20 (Fla. 1985).
261. See Kessler, 752 So. 2d at 552.

262. Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1166 n.2.
263. In all capital cases, a twelve-member jury is required and a six-member jury is required

in all other criminal jury trials. FLA. STAT. § 913.10 (1999).
264. Even Kentucky and Texas, the two states that grant criminal defendants the right to
conduct sequestered voir dire, limit that right to capital cases. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S.
415, 440 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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clearly explain and justify its decisions in Bolin and Kessler. First, despite
the Florida Supreme Court's assertions that individual voir dire is just the
"preferred practice 265 and "the decision as to individual and sequestered
voir dire is a discretionary decision for the trial judge,"2 the Bolin and
Kessler decisions clearly demonstrate that if there is prejudicial,
inadmissible information reported in pretrial publicity and individual voir
dire is not conducted, a conviction will be reversed. The court has
established a rule of criminal procedure, yet refused to acknowledge that
result.
Second, the court in Bolin ignored the United States Supreme Court
precedent established in Mu'Min v. Virginia. The Bolin court provided no
analysis distinguishing the Mu'Mn Court's ruling, nor did the Bolin court
rightfully provide a foundation for its ruling on state constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the Kessler court held that the Reilly, Boggs, and Bolin
decisions so clearly supported the proposition that individual voir dire is
the preferred practice to determine the extent ofjuror bias, that their ruling
267 Yet a thorough analysis of those three cases
was a mere reiteration.
defends the assertion that those cases did not, in fact, support the expansive
ruling of Kessler, and the Florida Supreme Court failed to provide any
reasoning to support its conclusion.
Lastly, the court left trial courts without any consistent analysis with
which to address issues of change of venue and juror competency. Are
jurors initially presumed impartial? If not, then what standard is to be
applied by the trial court when deciding a change of venue issue? The
Kessler court boldly asserted that "the practical and policy considerations
underlying these two issues are vastly different, 268 and then neglected to
indicate these considerations which led them to segregate these two areas
of law. Thus, the Bolin and Kessler decisions left trial courts not only
without discretion, but also without guidance, to decide these issues that
will undoubtedly arise in high profile criminal cases.

265. Kessler, 752 So. 2d at 552.

266. Bolin, 736 So. 2d at 1166.
267. Kessler, 752 So. 2d at 552.
268. Id.
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